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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daniel L. Widner appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional
guilty pleas to trafficking in marijuana and concealing a dangerous weapon while
in a motor vehicle. On appeal, Widner argues the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2010, a confidential informant identified Widner as a "target" in
a drug investigation.

(10/27/11 Tr., p.16, L.14 - p.20, L.25, p.32, L.6 - p.33,

L.4.) The informant, who had entered into a cooperation agreement with law
enforcement to work off his own delivery of marijuana charge, subsequently
participated in two controlled purchases of marijuana from Widner - one on
October 19, 2010, and one on December 14, 2010. (10/27/11 Tr., p.17, L.21 p.20, L.25, p.32, L.14 - p.33, L.14, p.37, Ls.9-24.)

Mountain Home Police

Detective Christopher Jessup supervised the informant's participation in each of
the controlled buys.

(10/27/11 Tr., p.18, L.16 - p.20, L.25, p.32, L.6 - p.33,

L.14.)
On January 11, 2011, the informant contacted Detective Jessup and
advised him that he (the informant) believed Widner would be traveling to
California on either January 14 or January 21 to get a new supply of marijuana.
(10/27/11 Tr., p.21, L.18-p.22, L.4, p.39, L.17-p.40, L.23, p.41, Ls.16-22.)
On January 21, 2011, Detective Jessup contacted the informant and
asked if Widner had gone anywhere to get marijuana and if Widner had any
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marijuana at that time. (10/27/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.10-16, p.41, Ls.8-15, p.41, L.23 p.42, L.21.) The informant advised the detective he had not spoken to Widner in
a couple of days, but he believed Widner was out of marijuana. (10/27/11 Tr.,
p.22, Ls.17-24, p.42, L.25 - p.43, L.12.)

Later that same day, the informant

contacted Detective Jessup and told him Widner was still in town but was going
to be traveling to California.

(10/27/11 Tr., p.23, Ls.7-10, p.43, L.13 - p.44,

L.11.)
On January 26, 2011, Detective Jessup contacted the informant and
asked if Widner had gone or was going to California to get more marijuana.
(10/27/11 Tr., p.23, Ls.16-20, p.44, L 12 - p.45, L.9.) The informant advised the
detective that Widner was planning to travel to California in the upcoming
weekend. (10/27/11 Tr., p.23, L.24 - p.24, L.15, p.45, L.10 - p.46, L.18.)
On January 29, 2011, the detective contacted the informant and asked if
he had any information about when Widner was leaving.

(10/27/11 Tr., p.24,

Ls.16-22, p.46, L.19 - p.47, L.15.) The informant advised the detective he had
not spoken with Widner in a couple of days and believed he was already gone.
(10/27/11 Tr., p.24, L.23 - p.25, L.4, p.47, L.16 - p.48, L.3.) Later that same
day, the informant called the detective and told him Widner was planning to
leave for California in the early morning hours of January 30 to replenish his
supply of marijuana. (10/27/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.11-19, p.48, L.4 - p.49, L.25.) The
informant also advised the detective Widner would be returning to Mountain
Home from California "[s]ometime later that same night or [in the] early morning
hours on the following day." (10/27/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.20-23.)
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On January 30, 2011, Detective Jessup conducted surveillance on
Widner's house to ascertain if either of the two vehicles Widner "was known to
drive were actually gone from the residence." (10/27/11 Tr., p.25, L.24 - p.26,
L.9, p.50, Ls.18-24.)

After observing that both vehicles were still there, the

detective contacted the informant and asked whether Widner had actually left for
California and, if so, in what vehicle he was traveling. (10/27/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.1024, p.50, Ls.1-2, p.50, L.25 - p.51, L.8.)

The informant did not have any

information for the detective at that time. (10/27/11 Tr., p.26, L.25 - p.27, L.2,
p.51, Ls.9-15.)

Later that same day, however, the informant contacted the

detective and told him Widner had traveled to California with his (Widner's)
roommate, Alex Stewart, and they were in Stewart's vehicle. (10/27/11 Tr., p.27,
L.3 - p.28, L.11, p.51, L.16 - p.52, L.13.) The detective knew that Stewart drove
a light blue 1988 Honda Civic with Elmore County license plates. (10/27/11 Tr.,
p.28, L.12 - p.29, L.2, p.54, Ls.5-13.) After confirming the vehicle was not at
Stewart's residence or place of employment, Detective Jessup contacted his
partner and formulated a plan to attempt to intercept the vehicle when it came
back to Mountain Home later that evening. (10/27/11 Tr., p.29, L.3 - p.31, L.5,
p.53, L.25 - p.54, L.4.)
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on January 30, Detective Jessup and his
partner positioned themselves at the opposite ends of Mountain Home and
conducted surveillance for Stewart's vehicle. (10/27/11 Tr., p.30, Ls.4-6, p.54,
L.20 - p.56, L.3.) Detective Jessup also contacted the shift patrol supervisor
and relayed the information about Stewart's vehicle, its suspected contents and
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the need to locate it.

(10/27/11 Tr., p.30, Ls.7-16, p.56, Ls.3-14.)

The shift

supervisor, in turn, relayed that information to patrol officer Ryan Melanese.
(10/27/11 Tr., p.70, L.2 - p.72, L.6.)

Specifically, the supervisor gave Officer

Melanese the license plate number of Stewart's vehicle, told him there was "a
large amount of marijuana" in the vehicle, and directed him to stop the vehicle if
he could develop his own probable cause to do so. (10/27/11 Tr., p.71, L.15 p.72, L.6.)
At approximately 11 :30 p.m. on January 30, Officer Melanese was
running a stationary radar on Highway 30 in Mountain Home when he observed
a Honda Civic "coming in to town ... from the direction of the Interstate" at a "low
1

rate of speed." (PH Tr., p.4, L.11 - p.5, L.6; see also 9/13/11 Tr., p.9, L.19 p.11, L.22.) The officer confirmed with radar that the vehicle was traveling 28
mph in a 35-mph zone and then followed the vehicle as it traveled "further into
the city limits." (PH Tr., p.7, Ls.14-24.) While following the vehicle, the officer
recognized the license plate number as that of the suspect vehicle about which
he had earlier been advised. (10/27/11 Tr., p.72, Ls.7-13.) Ultimately, the officer
stopped the vehicle after he observed the driver fail to signal in two different
locations where the officer believed a signal was required. (PH Tr., p.7, L.25 p.8, L.18; 9/13/11 Tr., p.13, L.9 - p.27, L.13.)
When Officer Melanese approached the vehicle, the driver's side window
was only "slightly opened, approximately two or three inches," but he could smell

1

At the request of the parties, the district court took judicial notice of the
preliminary hearing transcript (PH Tr.) in ruling on Widner's motion to suppress.
(R., pp.152-53; 10/11/11 Tr., p.13, L.12-14.)
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the odor of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle.

(PH Tr., p.9, Ls.2-25.)

Widner was driving the vehicle and Stewart was in the front passenger seat. (PH
Tr., p.10, Ls.6-21.) Wider, who was visibly nervous and shaking, told the officer
the driver's side window was broken. (PH Tr., p.9, Ls.10-17.) At the officer's
request, Widner opened the driver's side door, at which point the odor of
marijuana "became even stronger."

(PH Tr., p.9, L.13 - p.10, L.5.)

When

questioned by Officer Melanese, Widner initially denied having smoked
marijuana and also denied there was any marijuana in the vehicle. (PH Tr., p.13,
L.11 - p.14, L.4.)

Later in the stop, after Detective Jessup arrived to cover

Officer Melanese, Widner admitted there was a baggie of marijuana in his jacket
and, after retrieving the jacket from the car, gave the baggie of marijuana to the
officers.

(PH Tr., p.15, L.3 - p.16, L.23, p.61, Ls.4-23.)

A drug dog

subsequently alerted on the vehicle, at which point officers searched it and found
a weapon as well as an additional 2.25 pounds of marijuana.

(PH Tr., p.17,

Ls.6-22, p.18, Ls.6-10, p.45, L.6 - p.46, L.17, p.49, L.20 - p.59, L.14, p.55,
Ls.13-25, p.87, L.24 - p.88, L.1 O; 9/13/11 Tr., p.53, Ls.16-25.)
The state charged Widner with trafficking in marijuana and with
concealing a dangerous weapon while in a motor vehicle.

(R., pp.35-36.)

Widner moved to suppress the evidence against him, contending, inter a/ia, it
was the fruit of unlawful seizure. 2 (R., pp.43-89; 9/13/11 Tr., p.2, L.9 - p.4,

2

Although Widner captioned his motion a "Motion in Limine," the motion was, in
substance, a motion to suppress (see, R., pp.43-59; 9/13/11 Tr., p.2, L.15 - p.4,
L.22), and the district court treated it as such (see, ~, 9/13/11 Tr., p.23 - p.5,
L.5; 10/11/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-8).
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L.22.) After several hearings (see generally 9/13/11Tr.;10/11/11Tr.;10/27/11
Tr.), the district court denied Widner's motion (10/27/11 Tr., p.158, L.4 - p.165,
L.7; R., pp.175-76.). The court agreed with Widner that the stop was not justified
based Widner's failures to signal, finding based upon the facts before it that no
turn signal was required at either of the two locations Widner was alleged to
have not signaled. 3 (10/11/11 Tr., p.112, L.21 - p.119, L.15; 10/27/11 Tr., p.7,
L.2 - p. 10, L.2, p.158, Ls.4-9.)

The court concluded, however, that the

information provided by the confidential informant supplied the officers with the
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop of the vehicle.
(10/27/11 Tr., p.94, L.20-p.98, L.18, p.158, Ls.9-12.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Widner entered conditional guilty pleas to
trafficking in marijuana and concealing a dangerous weapon but reserved the
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 4 (12/19/11 Tr., p.9, L.9 p.36, L.3.) The district court imposed an aggregate unified sentence of 15 years,
with one year fixed. (R., pp.188-90.) Widner timely appealed from the judgment
(R., pp.196-99.)

3

Because the court's finding in this regard is supported by substantial,
competent evidence in the record, the state does not challenge this finding on
appeal.
4

Although no written plea agreement appears in the record, it is evident from a
review of the change of plea transcript both that the plea agreement was
reduced to writing (see 12/19/11 Tr., p.10, L.18 - p.12, L.13) and that the parties
agreed, as a term of the plea agreement, that Widner was reserving the right to
raise on appeal a challenge to the denial of his suppression motion (see
12/19/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.9-14, p.20, L.20 - p.21, L.1, p.23, L.7 - p.25, L.6, p.31, L.23
- p.32, L.4, p.35, Ls.17-18).
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ISSUE
Widner states the issue on appeal as:
Can a tip from a confidential informant which passes along
hearsay information given to the informant by an unidentified
person or person whose information has proven incorrect in the
past and whose basis of knowledge, reliability and veracity are
completely unknown, provide reasonable and articulable suspicion
to support an investigatory stop?
(Appellant's brief, p.10.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Widner failed to establish error in the denial of his suppression
motion? More specifically, has Widner failed to show error in the district court's
conclusion that the information supplied by the confidentia1 informant was
sufficiently reliable to provide officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary to
support the investigative stop of the vehicle Widner was driving?
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ARGUMENT
Widner Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion

A.

Introduction
Widner challenges the denial of his suppression motion, arguing as he did

below that the information supplied by the confidential informant was not
sufficiently reliable to provide officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary to
conduct an investigative stop of the vehicle Widner was driving.

(Appellant's

brief, pp.13-22.) Widner's argument fails. The district court correctly applied the
law to the facts in concluding the stop was constitutionally reasonable based
upon the information supplied by the confidential informant.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810,
203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16,
19 (2007).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
The Information Supplied By The Confidential Informant Was Sufficiently
Reliable To Provide Officers With The Reasonable Suspicion Necessary
To Justify The Investigative Stop
A routine traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure of the

vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
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(1979); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App.
1998). Because a routine traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it
is analyzed under the principles of an investigative detention as set forth in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54; State v. Sheldon, 139
Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). "An investigative detention
is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion
that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at
21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts and the
rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts." State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983,
88 P.3d at 1223; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ).

While the "quantity and quality of

information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that
necessary to establish probable cause .... reasonable suspicion requires more
than a mere hunch or 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion."' Bishop, 146
Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30
(1990)). The reasonableness of the police officer's suspicion is evaluated based
upon "the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time
of the stop." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210 (citing Sheldon, 139
Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18
(1981)).
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The reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigative detention
may be supplied by an informant's tip or a citizen's report of suspected criminal
activity. White, 496 U.S. at 329; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 121 O;
State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2000). "Whether
a tip amounts to reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the
circumstances including the substance, source, and reliability of the information
provided." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210 (citing White, 496 U.S. at
328-29). Factors to be considered in assessing whether a tip bears adequate
indicia of reliability to justify a Terry stop include:

(1) "whether the informant

reveals his or her identity and the basis of his or her knowledge;" (2) "whether the
location of the informant is known;" (3) "whether the information was based on
first-hand observations of events as they were occurring;" (4) "whether the
information the informant provided was subject to immediate confirmation or
corroboration by police;" (5) "whether the informant has previously provided
reliable information;" and (6) "whether the informant could be held criminally
liable if the report were discovered to be false." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811-812,
203 P.3d at 1210-11. "The more reliable the tip, the less information required to
establish reasonable suspicion."

kl at 812, 203 P.3d

at 1211.

As evidenced by the factors cited above, the assessment of the reliability
of any particular tip varies depending on whether the tip was anonymous or,
instead, received from an informant whose identity was known or readily
ascertainable by law enforcement.

kl

"An anonymous tip, standing alone, is

generally not enough to justify a stop because an anonymous tip alone seldom
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demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity." Larson, 135 Idaho
at 101, 15 P.3d at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing White, 496 U.S.
at 329; Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000)); see also Bishop, 146 Idaho at
812, 203 P.3d at 1211 (anonymous tip that provides only description of subject
and alleges commission of crime "generally will not give rise to reasonable
suspicion"). Where, however, "a tip is received from a known citizen-informant,
the tip is generally sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion."

Bishop, 146

Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211 (citing State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 965,
88 P.3d 780, 784 (Ct. App. 2004)). Such tips are "presumed reliable because
the informant's reputation can be assessed and, if the informant is untruthful, he
or she may be subject to criminal liability for making a false report."

!st.

While

police generally need not independently verify such tips, "the content of the tip
and the informant's basis of knowledge remain relevant" under the totality of the
circumstances analysis.

!st.

(citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47

(1972); Van Dorne, 139 Idaho at 965, 88 P.3d at 784; State v. Zapata-Reyes,
144 Idaho 703, 708, 169 P.3d 291, 296 (Ct. App. 2007)).
Application of the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case
supports the district court's determination that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the information supplied by the confidential informant was
sufficiently reliable to establish reasonable suspicion justifying the Terry stop of
the vehicle Widner was driving. Detective Jessup testified he knew the identity
of the confidential informant and had worked with him on four separate
"operations" in the nearly four months preceding the stop in this case. (10/27/11
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Tr., p.17, L.16 - p.18, L.25, p.94, Ls.20-23.)

On each of those occasions,

Detective Jessup was able to verify through independent investigation the
information he received from the informant. (10/27/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.1-10.) Of the
four operations in which the informant had previously proved reliable, two of
them involved the controlled purchase of marijuana from Widner. (10/27/11 Tr.,
p.19, Ls.11-18, p.95, Ls.9-11.) The informant himself had identified Widner as a
"target" and that information proved accurate because, after each controlled
purchase, the informant returned to Detective Jessup with a green leafy
substance that appeared, smelled and tested to be marijuana.

(10/27/11 Tr.,

p.18, Ls.11-15, p.19, L.11 - p.20, L.25, p.32, L.17 - p.33, L.14, p.37, Ls.9-24,
p.95, Ls.9-11.) Clearly, the facts that the informant was known to police and had
provided trustworthy information in the past are factors weighing in favor of the
reliability of the information provided by the confidential informant in this case.
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211.
Also weighing in favor of reliability is the fact that law enforcement was
able to corroborate through independent investigation certain details of the
information the confidential informant provided him in relation to this case. As
found by the district court, Detective Jessup dealt with the informant on
numerous occasions between January 11 and January 30, 2011. (10/27/11 Tr.,
p.21, L.18 - p.28, L.11, p.38, L.6 - p.53, L.15, p.95, Ls.5-8.)

During those

conversations - some which were initiated by the informant and some of which
were initiated by the detective - the informant advised Detective Jessup that
Widner was planning a trip to California to replenish his supply of marijuana.
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(See generally id.)

Although the informant initially believed Widner would be

leaving for California on January 14 or 21, the informant subsequently learned
Widner did not do so and relayed that information to Detective Jessup.
(10/27/11 Tr., p.21, L.18 - p.22, L.4, p.22, Ls.17-24, p.23, Ls.7-10, p.39, L.17 p.40, L.23, p.41, Ls.16-22, p.42, L.25 - p.44, L.11, p.95, Ls.9-23.) Ultimately, in
a conversation initiated by the informant on January 29, the informant told the
detective Widner was still in town but would be leaving for California in the early
morning hours of January 30 and would return to Mountain Home either later that
same evening or early the next day. (10/27/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.11-23, p.48, L.4 p.49, L.25.) In an attempt to verify that information, Detective Jessup conducted
surveillance on Widner's residence on January 30 to ascertain whether either
one of his vehicles were gone. (10/27/11 Tr., p.25, L.24 - p.26, L.9, p.50, Ls.1824.)

After observing that both vehicles were at the residence, the detective

contacted the informant and asked whether Widner was actually gone and, if so,
in what vehicle he was traveling.
p.50, L.25 - p.51, L.8.)

(10/27/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.10-24, p.50, Ls.1-2,

The informant did not have any information for the

detective at that time but soon thereafter called the detective back and told him
Widner and Stewart were traveling together in Stewart's vehicle. (10/27 /11 Tr.,
p.26, L.25 - p.28, L.11, p.51, L.9 - p.52, L.13, p.95, L.24 - p.96, L.4.)
Consistent with the information supplied by the informant, Detective
Jessup verified through independent investigation that Stewart's vehicle was
neither at his residence nor at his place of employment on January 30.
(10/27/11 Tr., p.29, Ls.3-20, p.30, Ls.20-25, p.96, Ls.6-7.) Also consistent with
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the information supplied by the informant, Officer Melanese observed Stewart's
vehicle entering Mountain Home from the direction of the Interstate in the late
evening hours of January 30. (PH Tr., p.4, L.11 - p.5, L.6; 10/27/11 Tr., p.72,
Ls.7-13, p.98, Ls.5-8.)
Finally, weighing in favor of a finding of reliability, the informant - having
purchased marijuana from Widner on at least two prior occasions (see 10/27/11
Tr., p.18, L.16 - p.19, L.18, p.32, L.14 - p.33, L.14) and having indicated to
Detective Jessup that he had personally spoken to Widner at least two times
between January 11 and January 30 (see 10/27/11 Tr., p.24, L.16 - p.25, L.4,
p.41, .23 - p.43, L.6, p.47, Ls.1-23) - was obviously personally acquainted with
Widner and had access to personal information about him.

In fact, when

Detective Jessup questioned the informant on January 30 about the specifics of
Widner's travel plans and in what vehicle he was traveling, the informant was
able to relatively quickly determine - and, as it turns out, accurately so - that
Widner and Stewart were traveling together in Stewart's car. (10/27/11 Tr., p.27,
L. 3 - p.28, L.11, p.51, L.16 - p.52, L.13.) While the informant did not specifically
disclose his basis of knowledge regarding Widner's plans to travel to California to
purchase marijuana, there is at least a reasonable inference, based on the
informant's references to having spoken to Widner and his ability to quickly
ascertain the details of Widner's plans, that the informant obtained at least some
of the information from Widner himself.

And, regardless of the source of his

information, the informant had no incentive to fabricate the allegations against
Widner.

To the contrary, the informant was obligated by his cooperation
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agreement with law enforcement to provide truthful information; had the
information he supplied turned out to be false, the cooperation agreement "would
have been terminated" and the delivery of marijuana charge he was attempting
to avoid would have been "pressed against" him.

(10/27/11 Tr., p.17, L.16-

p.18, L.10, p.21, Ls.4-13.)
The information relied on by law enforcement as a basis for the
investigative stop was supplied by a known confidential informant who had a
history of providing reliable information - including information that Widner was a
dealer of marijuana - who obviously had some sort of personal relationship with
Widner, and who was subject to criminal liability if he provided false information.
The information was also corroborated to some extent by the facts that police did
not see Stewart's vehicle at his residence or place of employment on January 30
but did see the vehicle enter Mountain Home from the direction of the Interstate
late in the evening on January 30 - the same time and date the informant
indicated Widner would be returning to Mountain Home from California.
Collectively, these circumstances established the reliability of the tip and gave
rise to reasonable suspicion justifying the investigative stop of the vehicle.
Discounting the totality of the facts that weigh in favor of reliability, Widner
argues on appeal that the information supplied by the informant was inherently
unreliable because it was necessarily based on hearsay - whether from Widner
or from someone else - and was not supported by any information about the .
"identity of the hearsay declarant or declarants, their basis of knowledge,
reliability,

or veracity."

(Appellant's brief,
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pp.17-20.)

While the state

acknowledges the nature of the information supplied by the informant was such
that he must have obtained it from someone else, such does not automatically
render the information unreliable for purposes of determining whether it supplied
officers with reasonable suspicion. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
Because reasonable suspicion is determined based on the totality
of the circumstances, including an informant's basis of knowledge,
the fact that a tip is based on hearsay information is only a factor to
consider in determining whether a stop was justified - it is not an
absolute bar to a finding of reasonable suspicion.
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 813, 203 P.3d at 1212 (citing United States v. Tucker, 305
F.3d 1193, 1200-01 (10 1h Cir. 2002); White, 496 U.S. at 328-29). Admittedly, the
original hearsay declarant's basis of knowledge, reliability, and veracity are also
factors under the totality of the circumstances analysis."

kl

(citing Tucker, 305

F.3d at 1201; United States v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39, 45-46 (1 51 Cir. 2006)).
However, even where such information is lacking, such deficiency may be
compensated for by some other indicia of reliability. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 233 (1983) (citing Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-147; Harris v. United States,
403 U.S. 573 (1971)); see also White, 496 U.S. at 331 (when information from
an anonymous tip bears sufficient indicia of reliability or is corroborated by
independent police observations, it may provide justification for a stop).
In this case, as explained above, it is reasonable to infer from the context
and content of the informant's disclosures to Detective Jessup that the
confidential informant obtained his information directly from Widner himself.
Again, the informant had purchased marijuana from Widner on at least two prior
occasions, had spoken to Widner at least twice during the course of the
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informant's contacts with Detective Jessup between January 11 and January 30,
and was able to determine relatively quickly in response to an inquiry by
Detective Jessup that Widner was traveling with Stewart in Stewart's vehicle.
Assuming, based on this evidence, Widner was the source of the informant's
information, there can be little doubt regarding Widner's reliability and veracity
concerning his first-hand knowledge of his own illegal activities. C.f., State v.
Vargovich, 113 Idaho 354, 356, 743 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Ct. App. 1987) (citation
omitted) (information based upon personal observation is "one of the strongest
possible indications of a basis of knowledge").
Even assuming the hearsay source of the confidential informant's
information was someone other than Widner, the lack of any specific evidence
about that source's basis of knowledge, reliability and veracity does not negate
the district court's conclusion, based upon the totality of all of the other
circumstances known to the officers, that the information was nevertheless
sufficiently reliable to supply the officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary
to justify the investigative stop of the vehicle. As explained by the United States
Supreme Court in White, supra:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion
can be established with information that is different in quantity
or content than that required to establish probable cause, but
also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause . ... Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is
dependent upon both the content of information possessed by
police and its degree of reliability. Both factors - quantity and
quality - are considered in the totality of the circumstances - the
whole picture, that must be taken into account when evaluating
whether there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a
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relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required
to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be
required if the tip were more reliable. The Gates Court applied its
totality-of-the-circumstances approach in this manner, taking into
account the facts known to the officers from personal observation,
and giving the anonymous tip the weight it deserved in light of its
indicia of reliability as established through independent police work.
The same approach applies in the reasonable-suspicion context,
the only difference being the level of suspicion that must be
established.
White, 496 U.S. at 330-31 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Even treating the original source of the information supplied by the
confidential informant as an anonymous tipster, application of the totality of the
circumstances approach shows the information bore adequate indicia of
reliability to provide the officers with reasonable suspicion. As set forth in more
detail above, the circumstances favoring a finding of reliability include the facts
that: (1) the informant was himself known to the police; (2) he had previously
provided

reliable information both about Widner and about other drug

operations; (3) he had personal contact with Widner on at least two occasions
between January 11 and January 30; (4) he was subject to criminal liability if the
information he provided proved to be false; and (5) and the information was
corroborated by independent police investigation and observation. Taking into
account the "whole picture," the information supplied by the confidential
informant was sufficiently reliable to give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying
the traffic stop. Widner's assertions to the contrary are without merit.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
district court's order denying Widner's motion to suppress.

DATED this 2nd day of July 2013.
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